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I.   INTRODUCTION
Is the domain of contract waxing or waning? Lawrence Fried-
man’s pathbreaking 1965 book, Contract Law in America, character-
ized contract law as covering a residual category of relatively unim-
portant transactions. He argued that whenever particular types of
transaction became sufficiently salient—such as those concerning
employment or insurance—specialized regulation was promulgated
that “robbed contract [law] of its subject-matter.”1 Nine years later,
Grant Gilmore expressed this idea similarly in The Death of Con-
tract, where he regarded “the general law of contract as a residual
category—what is left over after all the ‘specialized’ bodies of law
have been added up.”2
In stark contrast to this residual conception, many scholars have
trumpeted a much more imperialist conception of contract’s domain.
John Langbein, for example, recently opined:
Contract has become the dominant doctrinal current in modern
American law. In fields ranging from corporations and partner-
ship, to landlord and tenant, to servitudes, to the law of marriage,
scholars have come to understand our legal rules as resting
mainly on imputed bargains that are susceptible to alteration by
actual bargains.3
Under this view, the bedrock principles of contract inform (or should
inform) an ever increasing range of legal relationships.4
                                                                                                                      
* William K. Townsend Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Jennifer Brown provided
helpful comments. This Article is the published version of the 1998 Mason Ladd Lecture de-
livered at the Florida State University College of Law.
1. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CASE STUDY 24 (1965).
2. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 7 (1974).
3. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J.
625, 630 (1995).
4. See, e.g., Richard Painter, Game Theoretic and Contractarian Paradigms in the
Uneasy Relationship Between Regulators and Regulatory Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV
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What gives? The easiest way to reconcile these radically different
claims about the domain of contract is to recognize that authors em-
ploy varying definitions about what makes a particular area of law
“contractual.” A residualist might only consider an area contractual
if disputes are decided by common law courts using common law
principles such as the consideration requirement.5 Imperialists on
the other hand might consider any field to be contractual if the par-
ties have substantial freedom to reorder their legal relationship pri-
vately.
Arthur Corbin long ago cautioned against scholars being diverted
by such definitional misunderstandings:
Definitions [of contract] have been constructed by almost all writ-
ers on law and in many thousands of judicial opinions . . . . It is a
very common error to suppose that legal terms, such as contract,
have one absolute and eternally correct definition. The fact is that
all such terms have many usages, among which every one is free
to select. One usage is to be preferred over another only in so far
as it serves our necessity and convenience.6
Corbin wisely warned that we should not particularly care whether a
field is characterized as contractual—unless something turns on the
characterization. Our first response to someone’s impassioned sug-
gestion that a particular area is or is not contractual should be “Who
cares?” or perhaps more precisely “Why should we care?”7
We should be quite skeptical of any canon definitions that are di-
vorced from consequentialist considerations. Essentialist debates
about what is contract are not only semantic in the most pejorative
sense of the word, but may divert attention from what is really at
stake. Common law decision making is prone to error when judges
divorce the meaning of words from their legal consequences.8 Take,
                                                                                                                      
149, 152-53 (1996) (suggesting regulatory agencies use a contract-like approach to regulat-
ing lawyers).
5. See, for example, Austin Scott’s arguments that trust law is not contractual be-
cause of its roots in the law of equity. See Austin W. Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the
Cestui Que Trust, 17 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 270 (1917). Langbein uses a more modern defini-
tion of contract in criticizing Scott. See Langbein, supra note 3, at 645-50.
6. ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 3 (1952) (footnote omitted); see
also Robert Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 60 (John Pratt & Richard Zeckhauser eds., 1985) (“The term
contract is more frequently used, even by lawyers, in varying senses than is the term
agency, so it would be neither right nor prudent for me to claim that one particular specifi-
cation of the term is the definitive legal notion of contract.”).
7. I admit, however, to having an irrational commitment to some arbitrary word
meanings where little turns on the meaning. For example, like Jack Balkin, I was born and
raised in Kansas City and have found myself in heated debates on whether or not I am a
“Midwesterner.” I am.
8. See RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 178 (1996) (arguing that analogic rea-
soning is “not reasoning but is at best preparatory to reasoning”).
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for example, a rent-to-own transaction whereby a consumer rents a
television with an option to buy. In struggling to determine whether
such a transaction is appropriately characterized a “credit sale,”
courts often lose sight of the fact that what turns on this designation
is whether the seller needs to disclose an implicit interest rate.9 Even
nonactivist judges who want only to be faithful to the legislature’s
intent should ask whether the legislature in using this term in-
tended to force rent-to-own businesses to disclose this type of infor-
mation. But in the most egregious examples of this type of reifying
interpretation, the standards for characterizing behavior are wholly
divorced from the legal consequences of the characterization.10
Given my extreme skepticism about the utility of defining a con-
tractual canon, I now will argue cautiously for the following defini-
tion: an area of law should be considered contractual if parties can
privately reorder a substantial portion of their legal relations.11
While I have no stake in maintaining that this is the only valid defi-
nition, I hope to show that the definition, in Corbin’s terms, might
prove to be convenient because it might lead policymakers and
scholars, when speaking of contract, to focus on a central aspect of
contract—whether and how parties contract around default rules.
This definition puts me squarely within the imperialist camp, but
in three senses, I claim only to be a “wimpy imperialist.” First, the
focus on rules that are susceptible to private reordering does not
necessarily include areas of law in which the rules conform to the
“hypothetical contract” that parties would enter into if they could
costlessly contract.12 Thomas Jackson, for example, has claimed that
                                                                                                                      
9. See, e.g., Palacios v. ABC TV & Stereo Rental, 365 N.W.2d 882, 885-87 (Wis. App.
1985).
10. See, e.g., Delta Life & Annuity Co. v. Freeman Fin. Servs. Corp., 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14897, at *7-11 (9th Cir. 1995). This case (which I unsuccessfully argued in the ap-
pellate court) forced the court to decide whether the remarketing of annuities constituted
the “business of insurance” under the three-part standard announced in Hartford Fire In-
surance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). See Delta Life & Annuity, 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14897, at *7-11. However, neither the Supreme Court’s standard nor the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s application was tied to the legal consequence—exemption from antitrust liability un-
der section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1988).
11. This definition is close to many others in the field. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 3,
at 629 (“The bedrock elements of contract are consensual formation and consensual
terms.”).
12. See Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Re-
sponse to the Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 17 (1990). Butler and Ribstein posit:
It is . . . a mistake to identify the hypothetical bargain approach with the con-
tract theory of the corporation. Yet several commentators have done just that,
and have then proceeded to criticize the contract theory because the hypotheti-
cal bargain approach is inconsistent with it, or otherwise defective. If anything,
the defects of the hypothetical bargain approach provide another argument in
favor of the contract theory: To the extent that courts and legislators follow this
approach in adopting default provisions, it is important to permit the parties to
opt out of it in order to escape its defects.
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bankruptcy rules conform to the hypothetical bargain that creditors
would strike amongst themselves.13 But as Jules Coleman has
acutely observed, these theories are really arguments that particular
rules are efficient.14 The hypothetical bargain approach is used rou-
tinely to describe areas of law that are not contractual because the
rules are largely mandatory or not susceptible to private reordering,
such as bankruptcy or professional ethics. Describing such areas as
being contractual is not useful. Because hypothetical bargaining
theories routinely assume monolithic preferences (i.e., every con-
tracting pair is assumed to want the same contract), these theories
divert policymakers from making the difficult but important assess-
ments about whether particular rules should be susceptible to pri-
vate reordering or not.
Second, my definition of contract is wimpy because it does not in-
corporate a presumption that contractual rules should be defaults
(susceptible to private reordering) or a presumption that majori-
tarian defaults should be chosen. In contrast, Fred McChesney rep-
resents what I would call a strong-form imperialist. To his credit, he
clearly states what hinges on calling corporate law contractual:
“Since the firm is best explained in the contractarian paradigm as a
set of contractual rules that reduce transaction costs, mandatory law
overriding contracts is the exception. Those advocating legal coercion
thus must bear the burden of showing why coercion should trump
contracts.”15 But the fact that a substantial number or even a major-
ity of rules are susceptible to private reordering does not create a
presumption that other rules in the area should be. Here, McChes-
ney is leaping from “is” to “ought” without sufficient justification. My
wimpy brand of contractarianism more modestly hopes to focus poli-
cymakers and scholars on the consequences of making particular
rules mandatory. In addition, a conclusion that particular rules
should be susceptible to private reordering does not lead me to pre-
sume that these defaults should be set at what the majority of con-
tractual parties favor. Indeed, Rob Gertner and I have shown that
                                                                                                                      
Id.
13. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 228-48
(1986); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditor’s
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 860 (1982); Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature
of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditor’s Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV.
155, 156 (1989). Ron Gilson has similarly argued that many mandatory rules of professional
responsibility are consistent with the hypothetical bargain that clients would collectively
strike. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Per-
spective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 875-77 (1990).
14. See Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions
and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 644 (1989).
15. Fred S. McChesney, Contractarianism Without Contracts? Yet Another Critique of
Eisenberg, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1335 (1990).
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“penalty” or “information-forcing” defaults might produce more effi-
cient contractual equilibria than so-called majoritarian defaults.16
My wimpier conception of contract intends to induce a more explicit
consideration of how parties would bargain in the shadow of a vari-
ety of possible defaults.
Finally, by demanding that a substantial number of rules be sus-
ceptible to private reordering, the definition does not include areas
where parties make all-or-nothing decisions to consent to a whole set
of legal rules. The definition thereby excludes vast areas of tort and
regulatory law that individuals opt into by consenting to undertake
particular activities, such as driving cars. While there are interest-
ing positive and normative issues about how particular sets of man-
datory rules affect individuals’ decisions to participate in particular
activities, characterizing such areas as contractual might divert the
policymakers’ focus away from the core issues that should be in the
foreground of policymakers’ and scholars’ minds.
In particular, my thesis is that defining the contractual canon as I
have will help illuminate three normative issues: (1) Should par-
ticular rules be mandatory or merely defaults (which may be pri-
vately changed)? And if defaults, (2) Which default should be cho-
sen?; and (3) What should be the necessary and sufficient conditions
for contracting around the default? The impulse of too many scholars
is to analyze legal rules as though, like much of tort law, they were
not or could not be susceptible to private reordering. But a host of
related normative questions arises in contexts where parties have or
should have the freedom to reorder substantial parts of their legal
relationship.
II.   IMMUTABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
In deciding whether particular rules should be mandatory, poli-
cymakers should consider whether restrictions on the parties’ free-
dom of contract are justified either by “externalities” or “paternal-
ism” in that lawmakers might make rules mandatory to protect peo-
ple not in contractual privity (e.g., as in the mandatory prohibition of
criminal conspiracies) or to protect people who are parties to the con-
tract itself (e.g., as in the mandatory prohibition against contracting
with infants).17 Consequentialists will also want to consider carefully
the interaction between mandatory and default terms of contracts
and the effect of mandatory rules on the ability of people to contract
                                                                                                                      
16. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 95 (1989).
17. See id. at 88; Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92
YALE L.J. 763, 786 (1983).
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at all. For example, the mandatory prohibition against usurious in-
terest rates might limit the ability of high-risk consumers to borrow
money or might induce sellers with bargaining power to extract their
profits in a less efficient manner.
In reality, many prophylactic rules that are initially characterized
as mandatory often can be modified to give even more protection to
one of the contracting parties. For example, the mandatory duty of
good faith can be contracted around to enhance a promisor’s fiduci-
ary duties. Policymakers should consider whether a mandatory re-
striction should prohibit all private reorderings or whether it should
merely establish mandatory ceilings or floors to contractual duties.
Finally, when establishing mandatory restrictions on freedom of
contract, the law perforce needs to establish how it will react to par-
ties’ attempts to contract around these restrictions. The law of con-
tracts has displayed two generic responses to such attempts at vio-
lating immutability. One response, which is captured by the equita-
ble doctrine of cy pres, reforms the offending provision to the “clos-
est” nonoffending term. For example, if an employer contracts for an
unreasonably long covenant not to compete, the law might respond
by enforcing only a reasonable covenant not to compete.
The second broad legal response is structured to deter such at-
tempts by punishing the responsible party. The law can deter immu-
tability violations not only by criminally sanctioning the attempts (as
with conspiracies to violate mandatory criminal rules), but also by
reducing the contractual rights of one contracting party. The “blue
pencil” interpretative method of striking out offensive contractual
provisions may have such a penalizing effect. For example, if an em-
ployer extracts a covenant not to compete for an unreasonable time,
the blue pencil method may result in the employer having no protec-
tion against competition, instead of reducing the duration of the
covenant to what would have been a reasonable period.18
A subtler way the law might deter attempts to contract around
mandatory restrictions is to promote contractual opportunism by the
parties within such invalid contracts. While controlling contractual
opportunism is usually one of the primary purposes of contract law,
courts might want to foster contractual opportunism when parties
contract for prohibited provisions in order to deter parties from en-
tering into such contracts in the first place. For example, by voiding
all contractual and restitutionary duties with regard to such “illegal”
contracts, courts can undermine parties’ incentives to rely in ad-
                                                                                                                      
18. See G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431,
442 (1993).
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vance on the other side’s performance for fear that the other side will
walk away from its unenforceable duty to perform.19
A classic example of the law struggling to choose between the cy
pres and deterrence responses to contracting around mandatory rules
can be found in the trial court and appellate decisions in Frostifresh
Corp. v. Reynoso.20 There, the trial court responded to a seller’s un-
conscionably high markup on a freezer by deciding that the buyer
was not required to pay any profit;21 the appellate court agreed that
the contract was unconscionable but reversed the trial court’s deci-
sion, which held that the buyer was required to pay a “reasonable
profit.”22
III.   CHOOSING THE DEFAULT
Even if the law allows freedom of contract to reign, it still must
decide how to fill obligational gaps in agreements—those places
where parties fail to specify their respective contractual duties
fully.23 There are several competing theories on how to choose de-
faults.24 The most widely accepted standard is to choose the default
that most parties would choose if they could costlessly contract. This
“majoritarian” standard has the intuitive appeal that choosing the
default which most parties want promotes efficiency by minimizing
the transaction costs expended to contract around a particular rule.
                                                                                                                      
19. Countenancing ex post opportunism by one side of the contract will only deter ex
ante contracting if the potential future victim has sufficient knowledge to know that it
should not enter into this type of contract. Buyer opportunism should increase the buyer’s
willingness to contract and decrease the seller’s willingness to contract. The latter effect
will only dominate and deter contracting if sellers know at the time of potential contracting
about the legal system’s likely reaction. Thus, deciding that employers do not need to pay
undocumented workers will only reduce the demand for illegal immigration if the potential
workers in question know that they may be subject to such ex post exploitation. See Gates
v. Rivers Constr. Co., 515 P.2d 1020, 1021 (Alaska 1973).
20. 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev’d, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Term. 1967).
21. See id. at 759-60.
22. See Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964, 965 (App. Term. 1967).
23. Lawyers refer to obligational gaps as rendering contracts “incomplete,” while
economists use the same term to refer to contracts that are not sufficiently state contingent.
See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice
of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 730 (1992); Gillian K. Hadfield, Judicial Competence and
the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 170 (1994).
24. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal Tailoring of Contractual
Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 18 (1993) (discussing whether defaults should be rule-
like or standard-like); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 127 (suggesting the economic the-
ory of default rules); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contrac-
tual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 906 (1992) (forwarding a “consent theory” for default
rules); David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Inter-
pretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1877 (1991) (critiquing the hypothetical bargaining the-
ory); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract De-
fault Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 64 (1990) (suggesting a strategic bargaining theory of default
rules).
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While the majoritarian standard has acquired the status of pre-
sumptive correctness, I, as a wimpy imperialist, am intrigued with
both empirical and theoretical counter-examples. Empirically, it may
be difficult to identify a majoritarian rule for the simple reason that
there may be several rules that a majority of parties fail to contract
around. In other contexts, there may be three or more popular provi-
sions so that policymakers could do no better than identify a “plural-
ity” rule.
Theoretically, it has been shown that nonmajoritarian default
rules can be more efficient for a variety of reasons. First, it might be
more efficient to select a default that only a minority of contractors
prefer if this minority would otherwise bear particularly high costs
of contracting around or failing to contract around the default
rules.25 Second, inducing parties to contract around a non-preferred
default might induce contractors to disclose private information to
each other or to third parties (including courts).26
Regardless of whether policymakers embrace majoritarianism,
they often must also decide two other dimensions: whether the de-
fault should be “tailored” or “one-size-fits-all,” and whether the de-
fault should be a “rule” or a “standard.”27 The majoritarian default
approach commands lawmakers to provide the gap-fillers that most
people want but does not define the population over which to calcu-
late the majority. As the population size is reduced, the default
choice becomes more “tailored” to more particularized characteristics
of the contracting party. At the extreme, a tailored default seeks to
provide the hypothetical contractual provision that each particular
contracting pair would have contracted for ex ante. A related but
separate issue concerns whether the chosen default should be rule-
like or standard-like. Legal standards are muddier provisions with
contours that often are determinable only after the fact, unlike the
more crystalline provisions of legal rules that are more readily
knowable ex ante.28
Lawmakers choose the degree of tailoring and muddiness in non-
contractual areas as well. For example, in deciding the due care
standard for torts, the law inevitably must establish whether this
                                                                                                                      
25. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 108-18 (providing an algebraic model of the
costs of contracting around default rules).
26. See id.
27. See Ian Ayres, Review, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of
Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1391, 1411-13 (1992) (discussing whether fidu-
ciary duty defaults should be rules or standards); Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Op-
timal Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 4-5 (1993) (discussing
whether default rules should be “tailored” or “off-the-rack”).
28. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 559-60 (1992); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577,
577 (1988).
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generally mandatory duty is tailored to particular characteristics of
the tortfeasor or victim, as well as the degree of muddiness.29 How-
ever, it is extremely dangerous to import tort (read: mandatory)
theories about tailoring or muddiness to contract. The consequences
of choosing an untailored standard are likely to be very different
when parties can obliterate the law literally with a few strokes of a
pen.
IV.   PREREQUISITES FOR PRIVATE REORDERING
Even after deciding that a particular legal relationship will be
subject to private reordering and after choosing what default provi-
sion will govern when the parties have been silent, the law must still
establish what constitutes nonsilence; that is, the law must identify
the necessary and sufficient conditions for supplanting or contract-
ing around defaults. A number of cases turn on the question of suffi-
ciency. When parties attempt to contract around a default, the court
must decide whether the attempt was sufficient to create an alterna-
tive contractual obligation. For example, in Jacob and Youngs, Inc.
v. Kent30 and in Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co.,31 the
courts, while upholding the private parties’ freedom to contract for
contrary results, found that the contractual language was not suffi-
cient to give rise to “cost of performance” damages. These cases es-
tablish that certain manifestations are not sufficient to contract
around a “diminution in value” damage measure but do not establish
what would be sufficient. Judicial holdings and statutes that estab-
lish particular language as sufficient have the effect of creating safe
harbors for parties that want to establish alternatives to a particular
default. At other times, contract law clearly mandates the conditions
necessary for contracting around a particular default, as in the Uni-
form Commercial Code provision that comes close to requiring that
waivers of the implied warranty of merchantability use the word
“merchantability” and be conspicuous.32
The legal choice of these necessary and sufficient conditions can
provide valuable information to a variety of people. Most impor-
tantly, the language that parties use to supplant default provisions is
the most direct manifestation of their consent to the changes. Rules
regarding the verbal as well as the nonverbal conditions (e.g., con-
spicuousness, separate initialing) can insure that the non-drafting
party is aware of the particular term and thus help police the quality
                                                                                                                      
29. Consider, for example, the malleable “reasonable man” standard versus the rule of
res ipsa loquitur.
30. 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921).
31. 382 P.2d 109, 114 (Okla. 1962).
32. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1995).
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of the parties’ consent. However, manipulating the conditions for
contracting around defaults can also provide information to third
parties. Specifically, requiring explicit manifestations of intent can
give courts valuable information about the scope of the contract.
Policymakers, at times, might also want to provide information to
ancillary members of society. Policymakers will want to make sure
that the method that parties use to contract around the default re-
veals the intended type of information, especially when a penalty de-
fault is chosen because of its information-forcing quality. For exam-
ple, the default damages for lost profit on consumer sales might use-
fully be set to zero dollars as a penalty default in order to encourage
sellers to contract for liquidated damages and thereby to provide
consumers with better information about the seller’s expected
profit.33 Providing this profit information might allow consumers to
take more efficient precautions against breach34 and might also give
consumers more bargaining power.
The first goal, facilitating efficient consumer precaution, could be
accomplished by simply requiring that the liquidated damages clause
make clear to consumers that the consequence of not purchasing will
be a certain amount of money. But to further the second goal, in-
creased consumer bargaining power, the law might want to enforce
damages for lost profit only if the damages clause explicitly desig-
nates the liquidated amount as being compensation for lost profit. A
consumer negotiating to buy a compact car, upon learning that she
was about to sign a contract in which the seller claims $4000 in lost
profits, might be put on notice that she should continue negotiating
or search elsewhere.
An important, unexplored puzzle concerns the seemingly inten-
tional fuzziness of legal standards for contracting around particular
default rules. Many areas of law, even after decades of decision, re-
sist clear statements of the necessary and sufficient conditions for
contracting to a particular result.35 In classic “sufficiency” cases such
as Peevyhouse and Jacob and Youngs, it still is unclear what ex ante
contractual language would have reversed the result. Cynics might
view this as the back-door creation of mandatory rules,36 but an in-
                                                                                                                      
33. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 104; Victor P. Goldberg, An Economic
Analysis of the Lost-Volume Retail Seller, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 283, 298 (1984).
34. For example, consumers might protect themselves by searching for financing.
35. There are also mandatory provisions within contract law where courts almost in-
tentionally seem to resist precise characterization. For example, in most jurisdictions it
would be difficult to describe the exact maximum enforceable length of covenants not to
compete.
36. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analy-
sis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261,
321 (1985); Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 391 (1993).
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teresting issue for further research is whether there might be other
reasons why the law would intentionally make difficult or unclear
how to contract around default rules. A different way of character-
izing these cases is to consider them as attempts to make particular
provisions mandatory for some contractual parties but not for those
who are willing to undertake the difficult and uncertain process of
attempting to contract around the default provisions.37
My thesis is that defining the contractual canon to focus on pri-
vate reorderings focuses attention on whether and how default rules
might be reordered. In confronting each of the three default-centric
issues,38 the most persuasive normative analysis will explicitly com-
pare the predicted equilibrium of alternative rules. Too many arti-
cles argue for the efficiency of a particular rule without adequately
describing the contractual equilibrium under that rule and compar-
ing it to the contractual equilibria under alternative rules. Precious
few articles try to accomplish the valuable analysis of bringing real
world contracting evidence to bear in developing their consequen-
tialist claims.39
V.   A DWORKINIAN APPLICATION
To illustrate the normative payoff of thinking “contractually,” in
the sense of focusing on the three core gap-filling issues, I intention-
ally choose to discuss an area of law where the leading scholars are
apt to ignore contract. My illustration concerns Ronald Dworkin’s re-
cent suggestion that the First Amendment should ban most actions
for libel.40 What would it mean to think about this proposal through
the lens of contract? I will argue that thinking contractually raises
interesting questions about each of the three core default issues and
that consideration of these three issues ultimately undermines, or at
least substantially modifies, the proposal itself.
First, one should consider whether the rule banning all libel ac-
tions except for those involving actual malice should be mandatory
or merely a default rule. Dworkin, like most constitutional theorists,
is so inured to thinking only about mandatory rules that he does not
                                                                                                                      
37. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 125 (discussing the possible channeling
function of such sticky defaults).
38. See supra p. 901.
39. See, e.g., J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employ-
ment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 4 WIS. L. REV. 837, 863-77 (1995) (sur-
veying 221 employers regarding their contractual terms governing the discharge of employ-
ees).
40. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 209 (1996) (arguing that all plaintiffs should be required to prove actual
malice); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Earl Warren Is Dead, NEW REPUBLIC, May 13, 1996, at
35, 36 (reviewing DWORKIN, supra).
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consider this most basic issue. Currently many contracting parties
warrant the truthfulness of their representations, thereby contract-
ing for themselves an acceptance of liability if one of their represen-
tations is false, even if the misrepresentation is not made mali-
ciously. I doubt that Dworkin believes that such affirmative con-
tracts violate his conception of the First Amendment. The Constitu-
tion similarly should not prohibit laws that allow individuals to af-
firmatively opt into potential libel liability for nonmalicious misrep-
resentations. Just as the maker of carbolic smoke balls offered war-
ranties to its users to make its claims of effectiveness more credi-
ble,41 I see no reason why the Constitution should prohibit newspa-
pers from guaranteeing that all of their news is accurate and offering
to pay damages to anyone who might be injured through nonmali-
cious libel as a way of convincing readers that their product—the
news—is truthful. It would be a strange result, indeed, if the First
Amendment were read to prohibit giving people the option to stand
behind the truthfulness of their statements. This analysis suggests
that Dworkin’s proposed ban is (and should be) merely a default rule
and not, as it seems, mandatory.
But the conclusion that a particular legal rule is a default ineluc-
tably leads contract thinkers to ask the second of my default-centric
questions: which default is most appropriate? If the First Amend-
ment does not prohibit firms from opting into such a regime, why
should it prohibit a legislature from creating an opt-out regime? In
particular, why could not a legislature require that speakers in par-
ticular public fora open themselves up to pay libel damages for false-
hoods unless the speakers explicitly opted out by expressly dis-
claiming such potential liability? Dworkin needs to provide a reason
why a “no liability” default is to be constitutionally preferred to a
“potential liability” default. Dworkin might argue that certain opt-
out regimes are unconstitutional because forcing speakers to dis-
claim potential liability is too burdensome so that, as a categorical
matter, opt-out regimes are unconstitutional.
But this defense of Dworkin’s proposal itself necessitates an in-
vestigation of the third default-centric issue: the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for contracting around particular defaults. As a
theoretical matter, it is unclear whether an opt-in or opt-out regime
would be more burdensome to freedom of speech. If the majority of
speakers wants to signal the truthfulness of its statements credibly,
then forcing these speakers to opt into potential liability may be
more burdensome than forcing other speakers to opt out. Instead of
banning all opt-out regimes, the First Amendment might only re-
                                                                                                                      
41. See Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., [1893] 1 Q.B. 256 (Eng. C.A. 1892).
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strict the words of disclaimer required in order to opt out. For exam-
ple, requiring a speaker to say that her statement may include mali-
cious falsehoods as a precondition for avoiding libel damages may
overly burden the free speech right, but putting listeners on notice
that the speaker is not willing to be legally accountable for her mis-
statements is not, as an a priori matter, inimical to the underlying
goals of the First Amendment.
At a minimum, this contractual reconception has refocused the
terms of the debate. Instead of arguing whether libel laws are immu-
tably unconstitutional, we ask whether the default rule should be
“potential libel damages” or “no potential libel damages,” and what
should be sufficient to opt in or opt out of such liability.42 Once one
accepts that private parties should be able to opt into libel liability, it
is a short step to seeing that the state might constitutionally force
parties to opt out of such liability by forcing speakers to indicate, in
not overly burdensome ways, that they do not wish to be legally ac-
countable for their misrepresentations. Recast this way, Dworkin’s
bold proposal loses much of its oomph. The point here is not that an
opt-out regime is necessarily constitutional, but that it is a serious
enough contender to deserve more thorough and explicit considera-
tion.
This First Amendment analysis is by no means unique. The con-
tractual impulse can be applied, like the name game, to virtually any
rule of law. And while free market proposals often are thought to
have a conservative political valence, thinking contractually can de-
fang conservative as well as liberal proposals. For example, and in
contrast to Dworkin’s liberalism, contractual analysis can undermine
Richard Epstein’s proposal to repeal Title VII.43 Recast in contractual
terms, Epstein makes several questionable arguments against Title
VII as a mandatory rule and suggests that these arguments are suf-
ficient for repeal. But as long as Epstein would allow decision mak-
ers to covenant that they will not discriminate—and as a hard-core
believer in freedom of contract, Epstein would—his proposal is really
that Title VII become an opt-in regime with “no potential liability”
being merely the default rule. But just as Dworkin needs to provide
some reason why a “no potential liability” default is to be preferred
to a “potential liability” default, Epstein needs to explain why re-
                                                                                                                      
42. For a similar analysis of liability under security law for false statements by corpo-
rate directors, see Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the
Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945 (1991).
43. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUND: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992). For my fuller thoughts on this book, see Ian Ayres, Alterna-
tive Grounds: Epstein’s Discrimination Analysis in Other Market Settings, 31 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 67 (1994); and Ian Ayres, Price and Prejudice, NEW REPUBLIC, July 6, 1992, at 30 (re-
viewing EPSTEIN, supra).
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pealing Title VII is preferable to merely making Title VII a default
rule. While I am not in favor of either change, I think that changing
Title VII to a default that an employer could disclaim only with suffi-
ciently public disclosures would not lead to a significant change in
the current equilibrium. Most employers would be ashamed to con-
tract for the right to discriminate on the basis of race.44 Again, the
point here is that legal analysts can profit by thinking about the con-
tractual dimensions of problems even in areas that seem far removed
from the traditional canon of contract.
VI.   CONCLUSION
In studying for the Illinois bar, I was forced to learn dozens of
corporation rules that were dutifully squibbed in my review materi-
als. But I remember being frustrated that the materials invariably
failed to indicate whether particular rules could be contracted
around and if so, how. This method of teaching law is an unfortunate
part of many curricula. Increasingly, however, professors are em-
phasizing in their scholarship and in their teaching whether and
how private parties can reorder particular legal rules. While I re-
main highly dubious about the project of canon building, I confess
that I hope to instill a certain contractual impulse, or reflex, if you
will, in my students. Whenever they learn a new legal rule in any
field, I hope they will ask whether and how it can be contracted
around.
The debate over what it means to be “contractual” probably has
been most intense in the area of corporate law. Dozens of articles
have been written with the contractarian/noncontractarian divide
fracturing much of the literature.45 I propose no magic resolution to
                                                                                                                      
44. There might, however, be a significant number of employers who contract out of
disparate impact and/or reasonable accommodation duties.
45. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); Robert Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Du-
ties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
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this conflict. Give me your definition of contract, and I will try to tell
you whether, as a descriptive matter, corporate law conforms. If, like
Victor Brudney, you believe that contract requires a certain amount
of bargaining or market competition to ensure that contractual pro-
visions are properly priced,46 then you might reasonably conclude
that a corporation is not usefully described as a nexus of contracts.
On the other hand, corporate law seems to meet my wimpy imperi-
alist definition because a substantial number of rules are susceptible
to private reordering.
What I have characterized as the three core default questions are
of great importance in determining the scope of corporate law. But as
a wimpy imperialist, my contractual view of the corporation does not
close my mind to using mandatory rules or information-forcing de-
faults, or to manipulating the requirements for contracting around
defaults to improve social welfare. The quintessentially relational
nature of management’s contract with the firm raises distinct issues
of corporate governance. The quality of consent at a corporation’s in-
ception is often high, but the inception is so temporally removed
from future contingencies that complete contracting is impossible.
Inducing diversified investors to consider amendments seriously—
the so-called “midstream” problem—significantly reduces the quality
of consent for subsequent attempts to reorder the terms of the govern-
ance contract.47 The midstream problem and similar difficulties un-
derscore the importance of thinking about the consequences of prop-
erly regulating the scope and method of private reordering.
Unlike other theories, my vision of the contractual canon has not
made “promise,” “consent,” or “bargain” the defining theme.48 Indeed,
my definition does not even strictly require two contracting parties.
Hence, wills and estates are “contractual” in my view because the
laws of intestacy are merely defaults that individuals have the op-
tion to contract around.49 Placing “gap-filling” at the core focuses our
attention on the consequences of granting individuals (or an individ-
                                                                                                                      
of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879; Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
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46. See Brudney, supra note 45, at 1443-44.
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ual) the option to mutate their legal obligations—the consequences of
contractual freedom.50
                                                                                                                      
50. Richard Craswell has usefully distinguished between two different types of default
rules:
The rules of contract law can be divided into two categories: “background rules”
and “agreement rules.” As discussed earlier, background rules define the exact
substance of a party’s obligation, by specifying (among other things) the condi-
tions under which her nonperformance will be excused, and the sanctions which
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